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I. INTRODUCTION
At first blush, feminism and contract law seem to occupy different realms.
Feminism seeks to distinguish women from doormats,1 while contract law
provides theory and doctrine for state enforcement of certain kinds of promises.
But the two realms overlap more than many people realize.2 In particular, both
are fundamentally concerned with consent and agency. Having the capacity to
contract-to freely order one's affairs-has been a benchmark for
distinguishing full citizens from everyone else. Since much of feminism is
about women becoming citizens through contract and other means, some
feminists embrace contractarianism as a mechanism and reflection of
empowerment. 3 Other feminists are skeptical about whether most women
1. Describing the traditional goals of feminism in a single sentence, let alone a clause, is difficult.
Feminists disagree on many issues, including whether gender is innate or socially constructed and
whether law and society should treat men and women the same or account for women's particular life
experiences, such as primary responsibility for child care. A century ago Rebecca West coined the
doormat comparison to provide an overarching, if arch, description of feminism: "I myself have never
been able to find out precisely what Feminism is: I only know that people call me a Feminist whenever I
express sentiments that differentiate me from a doormat or a prostitute." Rebecca West, Mr. Chesterton
in Hysterics: A Study in Prejudice, THE CLARION, Nov. 14, 1913, reprinted in YOUNG REBECCA:
WRITINGS OF REBECCA WEST 5 (Jane Marcus ed., 1989).
2. Some contracts scholars have explored interconnections between feminism and contract law.
See, e.g., MARY JOE FRUG, POSTMODERN LEGAL FEMINISM 53-125 (1992); MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK,
THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 51 (1993); LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT:
SPOUSES, LOVERS, AND THE LAW 98-120 (1981); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND
RIGHTS 16, 33, 40-41 (1991); Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94
YALE L.J. 997 (1985); Mary Joe Frug, Rescuing Impossibility Doctrine: A Postmodern Feminist
Analysis of Contract Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1029, 1030 (1992); Gillian K. Hadfield, The Dilemma of
Choice: A Feminist Perspective on The Limits of Freedom of Contract, 33 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 337
(1996); Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for State Policy, 70
CAL. L. REV. 204 (1982); Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based
Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 309; Kellye Y. Testy, An
Unlikely Resurrection, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 219 (1995). Legal historians have weighed in as well. See,
e.g., Ariela R. Dubler, Governing Through Contract: Common Law Marriage in the Nineteenth Century,
107 YALE L.J. 1885 (1998). In the wake of the landmark surrogacy decision In re Baby M, 537 A.2d
1227 (N.J. 1988), a wide variety of scholars analyzed the enforceability of surrogacy contracts. See, e.g.,
ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1993); MARTHA A. FIELD, SURROGATE
MOTHERHOOD 28-29 (1988); CARMEL SHALEV, BIRTH POWER: THE CASE FOR SURROGACY 86 (1989);
Anita L. Allen, Surrogacy, Slavery, and the Ownership of Life, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 139, 147-48
(1990); June R. Carbone, The Role of Contract Principles in Determining the Validity of Surrogacy
Contracts, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 581, 592 (1988); Janet L. Dolgin, Status and Contract in
Surrogate Motherhood: An Illumination of the Surrogacy Debate, 38 BUFF. L. REV. 515 (1990).
3. See LINDA R. HIRSHMAN & JANE E. LARSON, HARD BARGAINS: THE POLITICS OF SEX (1998);
VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE PURCHASE OF INTIMACY (2005); Adrienne D. Davis, The Private Law of
Race and Sex: An Antebellum Perspective, 51 STAN. L. REV. 221 (1999); Martha M. Ertman, What's
Wrong with a Parenthood Market? A New and Improved Theory of Commodification, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1,
35-42 (2003); Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams, Preface to RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION:
CASES AND READINGS IN LAW & CULTURE I (Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., 2005); Jill
Elaine Hasday, Intimacy and Economic Exchange, 119 HARV. L. REV. 491 (2005); Carol M. Rose,
Women and Property: Gaining and Losing Ground, 78 VA. L. REV. 421 (1992); Shultz, Contractual
Ordering of Marriage, supra note 2; Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood,
supra note 2; Katharine Silbaugh, Commodification and Women 's Household Labor, 9 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 81 (1997).
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possess the bargaining power essential to making a deal work for all
4
concerned. Linda Mulcahy and Sally Wheeler's book Feminist Perspectives on
Contract Law5 enters this discussion by tracking some ways that contract law
has played a role in women's struggle for citizenship, and offers a point of
departure to discuss cases commonly studied in law school contracts classes.
Feminist Perspectives on Contract Law makes its contribution to this
endeavor with a largely British set of essays. The essays range widely,
including grand theory, case crunching, and legal archaeology. 6 Of particular
interest are the British spousal-guarantee cases, which shed light on American
cases such as Vokes v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 7 In re Baby M,8 and Williams v.
Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.9 Also of interest are chapters demonstrating that
gender lurks where it is least expected. Peter Goodrich's chapter explains how
the postal rule established in Adams v. Lindsell,10 a seemingly gender-neutral
rule dictating that acceptance is effective on the offeree's dispatch, has
gendered roots in that it extends the rule of marital contracting to commercial
contracts. 11 In this light, marital contracts become the template instead of the
exception in contract law, a considerable departure from conventional
wisdom. 12 Other chapters similarly reveal gender cross-currents running
4. See, e.g., Mary Becker, Problems with the Privatization of Heterosexuality, 73 DENy. U. L. REV.
1169 (1996); Ann Laquer Estin, Love and Obligation: Family Law and the Romance of Economics, 36
WM. & MARY L. REV. 989 (1995); Martha Albertson Fineman, Contract and Care, 76 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1403 (2001); sources cited supra note 2 (discussing surrogacy contracts).
5. FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON CONTRACT LAW (Linda Mulcahy & Sally Wheeler eds., 2005)
[hereinafter FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES].
6. Legal archaeology investigates the facts behind a particular case to tell the case's back story.
Debora L. Threedy, Legal Archaeology: Excavating Cases, Reconstructing Context, 80 TUL. L. REV.
1197, 1238 (2006). Examples of the genre include Kellye Y. Testy's research on the relational
background of Odorizzi v. Bloomfield School District, excerpted in RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS:
CASES AND DOCTRINE 1003-08 (3d ed. 2003); Richard Danzig, Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in the
Industrialization of the Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 249 (1975); Judith L. Maute, Peevyhouse v. Garland
Coal & Mining Co. Revisited: The Ballad of Willie and Lucile, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1341 (1995); A.W.
Brian Simpson, Contracts for Cotton to Arrive: The Case of the Two Ships Peerless, 11 CARDOZO L.
REV. 287 (1989); A.W.B. Simpson, Quackery and Contract Law: The Case of the Carbolic Smoke Ball,
14 J. LEGAL STUD. 345 (1985); Debora L. Threedy, A Fish Story: Alaska Packers Association v.
Domenico, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 185 (2000); and Lea S. Van der Velde, The Gendered Origins of the
Lumley Doctrine: Binding Men's Consciences and Women's Fidelity, 101 YALE L.J. 775 (1992).
7. 212 So. 2d 906, 907 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (holding that a "widow of 51 years .... [who]
was incessantly subjected to over-reaching blandishment and cajolery" and was "induced" to pay in
excess of $3 1,000 for dance lessons could bring a claim for rescission of the contracts).
8. 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987), rev'd, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). In this famous
surrogacy case, the New Jersey trial court ordered specific enforcement of the surrogacy contract,
compelling Mary Beth Whitehead to relinquish parental rights and obligations to the child she conceived
and bore pursuant to a surrogacy contract with William Stem. In re Baby M, 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1987). The New Jersey Supreme Court, in contrast, refused to enforce the surrogacy
contract because it conflicted with adoption law and public policy, observing that "[t]here are, in a
civilized society, some things that money cannot buy." In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1249 (N.J. 1988).
9. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
10. (1818) 106 Eng. Rep. 250 (K.B.).
11. Peter Goodrich, The Posthumous Life of the Postal Rule: Requiem and Revival of Adams v.
Lindsell, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, supra note 5, at 75-89.
12. My students generally find heart balm actions ridiculous, heartily agreeing with states' repeal of
actions such as breach of promise to marry in the early twentieth century.
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through contexts that seem gender-neutral, such as Bela Chatterjee's
contribution, which argues that cyber-contracting provides opportunities for
rethinking contract doctrine,' 3 and Linda Mulcahy's chapter championing
alternative dispute resolution as a means for importing feminist methodologies
to dispute resolution. 14
The British spousal-guarantee cases appear again and again in Feminist
Perspectives, notably Barclays Bank plc v. O'Brien,5 a recent statement of the
"special tenderness" doctrine toward married women and other cohabitants in
noncommercial guarantee cases, and Royal Bank of Scotland v. Etridge (No.
2), 16 which specifies methods for banks to rebut the presumption of undue
influence in these cases. New to many American readers, these cases involve
wives asserting undue influence, mistake, or misrepresentation to avoid their
guarantees of their husbands' business debts with the goal of preventing the
bank from foreclosing on the family home. This braiding of family and
commerce provides a new context for common contracts class discussions such
as the surrogacy cases' 7 and the classic case defining consideration, Hamer v.
Sidway.18
The spousal-guarantee cases are particularly suited for classroom
discussion because classical contract theory cannot quite resolve the issues they
raise. If parties are autonomous individuals engaged in discrete transactions,
why not enforce a surrogacy contract against Mary Beth Whitehead? 19 Why not
hold an uncle to his promise to give his ne'er-do-well nephew $5000 for.
refraining from the vices of smoke, drink, and gambling?20 The holdings in
these cases turn on the fact that they arise out of complex social relations of
love, duty, and trust. They thus raise questions about the boundaries between
autonomy and altruism, and consequently, between markets and families.
21
13. Bela Bonita Chatterjee, Different Space, Same Place? Feminist Perspectives on Contracts in
Cyberspace, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, supra note 5, at 109. Chatterjee contends that cyberspace, in
addition to being economic, is a political space in which power relations are renegotiated, and further
contends that a postmodern perspective on the fluidity offered by cyberspace enables the refiguring of
gender and other power relationships. Id. at 110-11. She concludes that in this context "law could move
from being a mere framework for commerce to a facilitator ofjustice." Id. at 112.
14. Linda Mulcahy, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Flaws? The Feminisation of Dispute
Resolution, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, supra note 5, at 141.
15. (1992)4 All E.R. 983 (C.A.).
16. (2001) 4 All E.R. 449, 466-68 (H.L.).
17. Some casebooks begin with surrogacy cases. See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 6, at 19, 30, 42
(excerpting In re Baby M, 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987) and related material). Carol
Sanger uses Baby M to preview the entire contracts class. Carol Sanger, Great Contracts Cases: (Baby)
M Isfor the Many Things: Why I Start with M, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1443 (2000). Other casebooks that
include the surrogacy cases include STEVEN J. BURTON, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 217 (2d ed.
2001); LON L. FULLER & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 174 (7th ed. 2001); and
AMY HILSMAN KASTELY ET AL., CONTRACTING LAW 462, 465 (2d ed. 2000).
18. 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891).
19. See Baby M, 525 A.2d 1128.
20. Hamer, 27 N.E. 256.
21. Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96
HARv. L. REV. 1497 (1983).
[Vol. 18:2
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Enter relational contract theory. Relational contract theory critiques
classical contract law for its failure to account for the lack of real agreement in
contracts where terms appear in pre-printed forms and bargaining power is
sufficiently unbalanced so that only one party has the power to determine those
terms. In place of the assumptions of autonomy and choice that inform classical
contract theory, relational contract theory offers norms of cooperation and
reciprocity to guide contract theory and practice.
22
As an ongoing venture, spousal contracts are as relational as they get,
which may explain the prominence of both relational contract theory and
spousal-guarantee cases in Feminist Perspectives. In Mulcahy's introduction
she suggests that relational contract theory can import an "ethic of care" they
deem "feminine" to contract law through norms of role integrity, flexibility,
and reciprocity. 23 The close relationship of the cultural feminist goals of
cooperation, trust, and altruism in relational contract theory is widely
24
recognized. However, the introductory chapter's insistent contrast of
"feminine values" with "masculine abstracted relations," even with caveats
about social construction, 25 seems a bit two-dimensional in light of anti-
essentialist feminist scholarship of recent years.
26
This talk of gender may sound foreign to most American contracts scholars
and students, since contract doctrine tends to employ gender-neutral analysis,
rarely acknowledging that women might have special interests in contract law.
Judicial recognition of women's special interests might relegate women to
second class citizenship, which would be inconsistent with courts' liberal
commitment to parties' individuality. This respect for individuality and choice,
which contracts theorists call the will theory of contract, 27 forms the foundation
22. See, e.g., IMPLICIT DIMENSIONS OF CONTRACT (David Campbell et al. eds., 2003); David
Campbell, Introduction to IAN MACNEIL, THE RELATIONAL THEORY OF CONTRACT 3, 5-11 (David
Campbell ed., 2001).
23. Linda Mulcahy, The Limitations of Love and Altruism-Feminist Perspectives on Contract
Law, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, supra note 5, at 1, 13. Relational contract theory materials on which
Mulcahy relies include IAN MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS (1980); and Stewart Macaulay, Elegant Models, Empirical Pictures, and the
Complexities of Contract, 11 L. & SOC'Y REV 507 (1977).
24. See, e.g., Elizabeth Mertz, An Afterword: Tapping the Promise of Relational Contract Theory-
"Real" Legal Language and a New Legal Realism, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 909 (2000); Elizabeth S. Scott &
Robert E. Scott, Marriage as a Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REV. 1225 (1998); Shultz, Contractual
Ordering of Marriage, supra note 2, at 301-03; Patricia A. Tidwell & Peter Linzer, The Flesh-Colored
Band Aid-Contracts, Feminism, Dialogue, and Norms, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 791 (1991); John Wightman,
Intimate Relationships, Relational Contract Theory and the Reach of Contract, 8 FEMINIST LEGAL
STUD. 93 (2000).
25. Mulcahy, supra note 23, at 1, 3.
26. See, e.g., Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The
Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1 (1995); Katherine M. Franke,
The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation ofSexfrom Gender, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 1 (1995); Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity in and After Bowers v.
Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1721 (1993).
27. Conventional wisdom justifies the legal enforcement of certain promises in contract law on the
grounds that parties voluntarily consented to the terms of the agreement. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS 20-21 (2d ed. 1990). A classic example of this approach is CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS
PROMISE (1981). Alternative justifications for legal enforcement of some agreements include economic
2006]
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of contract law. It defines courts' job as interpreting and enforcing contracts,
but not revising parties' agreements.2 8 In contrast, English law expresses a
"special tenderness" toward married women in a line of cases that Gillian
Hadfield has dubbed "spousal guarantee cases." These cases, discussed in
several chapters of Feminist Perspectives on Contract Law,29 involve wives
securing their husbands' business debts with the family home, often without
knowing the amount of the debt, that the loan jeopardizes the family home, or
even that they are signing loan documents.30 English courts, expressing a
"special tenderness" 3' to married women as well as those "in a like position,"32
presume undue influence in cases where non-commercial sureties guarantee
debts, and allow lenders to rebut this presumption by showing that the
wives/sureties fully understood and freely consented to guaranteeing their
husbands' business debts.
33
Despite American law's formal commitment to neutrality, many American
contracts teachers are familiar with the way that gender sometimes makes a
difference in contracts cases, albeit less explicitly than in the English spousal-
guarantee cases. American courts and students do not entirely ignore the fact
that Mrs. Vokes was a lonely widow, that Mary Beth Whitehead's surrogacy
contract concerned a service only women can provide, and that Ora Lee
Williams was a poor, African-American mother supporting seven children on
efficiency and distributive justice. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (6th
ed. 2002); Anthony T. Kronman, A New Champion for the Will Theory, 91 YALE L.J. 404, 411 (1981)
(reviewing FRIED, supra).
28. FRIED, supra note 27, at 2-3. Benjamin Cardozo famously articulated this reason for refusing to
enforce a contract with an ambiguous price term: "We are not at liberty to revise while professing to
construe." Sun Printing & Publ'g Ass'n v. Remington Paper & Power Co., 139 N.E. 470, 471 (N.Y.
1923).
29. Rosemary Auchmuty, The Rhetoric of Equality and the Problem of Heterosexuality, in
FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, supra note 5, at 53, 65 (citing Barclays Bank plc v. O'Brien (1992) 4 All E.R.
983, 998-1009 (C.A.) [hereinafter O'Brien I]). Another commentator observes that "[1]aw's gentle
concern and ministrations protect the role of the wife as the guarantor of continuity between generations
and properties." Adam Gearey, Women Lie Back Everywhere. The Symbolic Economy of Restitution, in
FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, supra note 5, at 91, 98.
30. O'Brien 1, (1992) 4 All E.R. 998-1009; Royal Bank of Scotland v. Etridge (No. 2), (2001) 4 All
E.R. 449 (H.L.).
31. Barclays Bank plc v. O'Brien, (1993) 4 All E.R. 417, 424 (H.L.) [hereinafter O'Brien 11].
32. Etridge (No. 2), (2001) 4 All E.R. 456. As the court explained in O'Brien II,
[T]his special tenderness of treatment afforded to wives by the courts is properly attributable
to two factors. First, many cases may well [establish] ... undue influence because the wife
demonstrates that she placed trust and confidence in her husband in relation to her financial
affairs and therefore raises a presumption of undue influence. Second, the sexual and
emotional ties between the parties provide a ready weapon for undue influence: a wife's true
wishes can easily be overborne because of her fear of destroying or damaging the wider
relationship between her and her husband.
O'Brien 11 at 424.
33. In cases where the relationship between the debtor and the surety is not commercial (i.e.,
family), banks can rebut the presumption of undue influence by retaining counsel to advise the
wife/surety (1) of the nature and consequences of the loan transaction; (2) of the seriousness of the risks
involved, including the loan amount and the bank's rights to increase the debt or change the terms; (3)
that she has a choice; and (4) to determine whether she wants to proceed with the transaction. Etridge
(No. 2), (2001) 4 All E.R. 470.
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$218 a month.34 Thus the question arises: To what extent do and should wives,
women, and feminine persons generally receive "tender" treatment by contract
law?
This Review tackles this question by using the English spousal-guarantee
cases' assertion of legal "tenderness" to women as a point of departure,
exploring how three possible meanings of "tender" might influence feminist
understandings of contract law:
(1) legal tender, i.e., women's access to cash, or lack thereof;
(2) solicitude toward a particularly vulnerable person, such as a child
(as in the tender years doctrine); and
(3) splitting the word in two to voice an imperative "tend her," which
raises questions of individual responsibility and liability, asking
whether, and when, legal doctrine should and does treat women as
autonomous individuals.
35
Some feminists might blanch at the prospect of legal "tenderness" specially
directed at women. 36 Against this grain, I contend here that a feminist view of
contract law and theory would do well to attend to these three enumerated
senses of "tender."
First, a feminist view should maximize women's access to capital, and thus
to choices in their lives. Second, it should recognize the systemic
vulnerabilities of certain classes of people, in particular dependents and those
who care for them.37 Third, it should strive to recognize the integrity of
individual women, resisting the powerful cultural tendency to subsume women
into relationships (daughter, mother, wife) and deprive them of that crucial
element of citizenship, individual choice. 38 Taken together, these three
concerns account for cultural feminists' attention to the relational roles played
by women, liberal feminists' concerns with autonomy, and material feminists'
concerns about control over the means of production. The fact that the spousal-
guarantee cases raise all three of these issues may explain why they get more
attention than other topics in Feminist Perspectives on Contract Law.
34. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Vokes v. Arthur
Murray, Inc., 212 So. 2d 906 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968); In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988); In re
Baby M, 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987).
35. A fourth meaning of"tender" may spring to contracts scholars' minds. "Tender" also describes
one party to a contract offering or undertaking to perform. Sellers tender goods to buyers, and buyers
tender payment for those goods. This sense of "tender" as "offer" coheres with the spirit of both this
essay and Feminist Perspectives on Contract Law in the sense of making feminism available to contract
theory and doctrine and vice versa.
36. See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, An Expressive Theory of Contract: From Feminist Dilemmas to a
Reconceptualization of Rational Choice in Contract Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1235, 1247 (1998).
37. MARTHA FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH
CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995).
38. This combination of material concerns, protection of vulnerability, and assertion of
individuality is at least as canonical as Adams v. Lindsell, (1818) 106 Eng. Rep. 250 (K.B.). Virginia
Woolf, herself a British feminist, famously asserted that for a woman to write, she needed money and a
room of her own. VIRGINIA WOOLF, A ROOM OF ONE'S OWN 2 (Harcourt Brace & Co. 1991) (1929).
2006]
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II. A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE CHECKERED PAST OF GENDER AND RACE IN
CONTRACT LAW
Historically, the legal doctrine of coverture limited married women's
ability to enter or enforce most contracts. Similarly, by not allowing them to
marry, contract doctrine deprived both male and female slaves of the capacity
to contract, placing them in a category with what were then called idiots,
lunatics, and infants. (While terminology has changed, mental disease or defect
and youth still deprive people of contractual capacity, for the most part.)39
Legislation such as the married women's property acts and the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 extended a measure of citizenship to white women as well as people of
color.40 The latter legislation explicitly linked contract and the freedmen's
citizenship by providing that "all persons ... shall have the same right ... to
make and enforce contracts ... as enjoyed by white citizens .... 41 These
doctrinal changes resonated with larger changes in nineteenth-century law,
culture, and politics.
The seismic changes that defined the nineteenth century affected contract
doctrine and contractual aspects of political theory in ways that continue to this
day. Slavery was contested and abolished, marriage was redefined from a
practical institution based on economics and community to a romantic
institution focused on love and companionship, industrialization changed the
ways Americans lived, and the modem welfare state emerged. Contract played
a key role in each of these changes: abolition replaced slavery with wage
labor,42 contract provided a metaphor signaling individuality and choice in
marriage,4 3 contract and commercial law evolved to facilitate industry,44 and
social contract theory provided a rationale for the expansive growth of the
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 14-15 (1981).
40. Civil Rights Act of 1866, Ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
1981(a) (2000)). One early married women's property act was Ohio's 1809 statue allowing married
women to devise property using wills. 1809 Ohio Laws 146, cited in Sarah Miller Little, A Woman of
Property: From Being It to Controlling It: A Bicentennial Perspective on Women and Ohio Property
Law, 16 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L. J. 177, 185 (2005).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000) was passed initially as the Civil Rights Act of 1866, then re-enacted
on firmer constitutional footing after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment as the Civil Rights Act
of 1870. For a fuller discussion of the history of § 1981 and citizenship for the freedmen, see Danielle
Tarantolo, Note, From Employment to Contract: Section 1981 and Antidiscrimination Law for the
Independent Contractor, 116 YALE L.J. 170, 185-87 (2006). Discrimination resting in contract
continues. To remedy it, Congress passed measures such as the 1974 Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691(f) (2000), which prohibits discrimination in credit transactions on the basis of
race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status, or age, provided the applicant has the capacity
to contract. Moreover, employment discrimination claims are often grounded in contract, making § 1981
relevant in those cases. Tarantolo, supra.
42. See, e.g., AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR, MARRIAGE AND
THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION (1998).
43. See, e.g., PETER BARDAGLIO, RECONSTRUCTING THE HOUSEHOLD: FAMILIES, SEX, AND THE
LAW IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY SOUTH (1995); MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH:
LAW AND FAMILY N NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1985).
44. See, e.g., William A. Schnader, The New Movement Toward Uniformity in Commercial Law:
The Uniform Commercial Code Marches On, 13 BUS. LAW. 646 (1958).
[Vol. 18:2
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welfare state.4 5 In 1864, Sir Henry Maine captured the importance of contract
for these changes, both doctrinally and in terms of political theory, in his now-
famous dictum: "[T]he movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been
a movementfrom Status to Contract.
4 6
One strand of political theory has questioned the extent to which women
and other marginalized people have truly been parties to this transition from
Status to Contract. Some feminists, for example, contend that women and
Blacks were left out of the social contract that forms the basis of liberal
political philosophy.47 More concretely, empirical research has demonstrated
that women and people of color get less favorable terms in particular contracts,
such as car sales, than white men.48 If parties do not have equal bargaining
power, contractual consent may not be genuine or complete. 49 Thus, contract
doctrine and theory must account for differences in bargaining power.
Although legal doctrine no longer deprives married women and African
Americans of contractual capacity, legal doctrine drags its disinherited self
behind it by incorporating elements of the old rules in canonical cases.
Recognizing this continued relevance of gender and race in contract doctrine,
albeit in altered form, provides new perspectives on classic contracts cases.
Turning to the present day, it is important to note that contract law already
incorporates much of what editors Mulcahy and Wheeler champion as feminist
approaches. Black-letter doctrine, a mix of law and equity, imports concerns of
justice to complement aims of certainty in basic rules such as the statute of
frauds, the parol evidence rule, and contract modification provisions. The
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) allows considerable flexibility in defining
what constitutes an agreement-the bargain-in-fact between the parties, as
indicated by their words and conduct, course of performance, course of dealing,
and usage of trade.50 Moreover, the U.C.C.'s version of the statute of frauds
provides safe harbors to prevent a party who actually entered into an agreement
from evading its legal enforceability on the grounds that she did not sign a
45. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); BETH A. RUBIN, SHIFTS IN THE SOCIAL
CONTRACT: UNDERSTANDING CHANGE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (1996); BRIAN SKYMS, EVOLUTION OF
THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1996).
46. HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF
SOCIETY, AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 165 (3d ed., H. Holt 1873) (1864).
47. See, e.g., CAROL PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT (1988); WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 15-
16.
48. See, e.g., IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE?: UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF PACE AND
GENDER DISCRIMINATION (2001); WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 44-51.
49. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 15-43, 224-28.
50. U.C.C. §§ 1-201(3), 1-205, 2-208 (2003). Course of dealing is conduct between the contracting
parties prior to entering the contract in question, while course of performance is repeated conduct
between parties under contract. Trade usage, in contrast, is practice in the trade or place that parties
justifiably expect will be observed. Id. §§ 1-205, 2-208 (2003). Defining a contract to include
relationship-based evidence of what the parties have done, as opposed to limiting the terms to what they
said they would do in a writing, recognizes the importance of relationships, cooperation, and changed
conditions in contract law.
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document. 5 1 Similarly, the U.C.C. Article 2 parol evidence rule allows even
writings that the parties intend to express their final agreement to be "explained
or supplemented" by course of dealing, course of performance, and usage of
trade, and also by consistent additional terms unless the parties also intended
the writing to be the "complete and exclusive" expression of their agreement.
52
Finally, Article 2's damage provisions create incentives to cooperate by
granting sellers a right to cure nonconforming tender in many circumstances,
53
and by limiting consequential damages to those that cannot be mitigated by
cover or otherwise. 54 In short, contract law already endorses a number of
principles that Mulcahy and Wheeler term feminist.
While these provisions demonstrate that a number of contract doctrines
already recognize interests Mulcahy and Wheeler dub feminist, that insight
leaves a larger question unanswered. We need an understanding of where hard
line contractarian analysis of traditional legal economics becomes subject to the
law of diminishing returns. Claims to individuality and cost-benefit analysis are
helpful, as two generations of legal economic scholarship and case law have
demonstrated. 55 But having a hammer in your hand does not mean that
everything in the world is a nail. Identifying the limits of the classical contract
theory assumptions that form the foundation of legal economic analysis serves
everyone, not just women, and not just feminists. Thinking about "tenderness"
in the three senses of money, solicitude, and independence can help students of
both feminism and contracts rethink their position on contracts, and thus on
legal economic liberal commitments to autonomy, choice, and wealth
maximization.
III. THE THREE SENSES OF "TENDER"
Having made the case for linking contract, citizenship, and feminism, we
can chart how Feminist Perspectives on Contract Law engages the three
understandings of "tenderness": money, solicitude, and individuality. The
following discussion explores ways in which the three senses of tenderness
arise in relation to the spousal-guarantee cases and also notes instances where
tenderness comes up in other contexts in the book, such as chapters about the
postal rule of Adams v. Lindsell, premarital agreements, and alternative dispute
51. Id. § 2-201 (2003) (providing for enforceability of agreements even without a writing signed by
the person against whom enforcement is sought where a merchant sends a confirming memorandum,
goods are specially manufactured, the party resisting enforcement admits to contract formation, or the
parties have delivered and/or accepted the goods or payment).
52. Id. § 2-202.
53. Id. § 2-508.
54. Id. § 2-715. A buyer covers, in Article 2, when she obtains substitute goods in the wake of the
seller's breach. Id. § 2-712.
55. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 27.
[Vol. 18:2
HeinOnline  -- 18 Yale J.L. & Feminism 554 2006
Legal Tenderness
resolution. I focus on spousal-guarantee cases since nearly a third (two of
seven) of the substantive chapters of the book focus on them.
56
A. Legal Tender
It makes sense to start with money, since contracts are usually about
money. Courts are better able to award money damages than things like
cheerful participation in a family dinner, and the doctrine of consideration
distinguishes enforceable (legal) agreements from non-enforceable (extralegal)
ones.57 Conventional wisdom accepts the bargain theory of consideration,
which justifies legal enforcement on the fact that parties give and get something
of value to induce promises or performance. 58 In addition to affecting doctrine,
money matters on a practical level. Money might not buy happiness, but it can
buy things that facilitate happiness, such as therapy, an apartment, three square
meals a day, mammograms, chemotherapy, flattering blue jeans, dinner out
with a date, CDs, music lessons, and beach vacations.
59
Some scholars flag the importance of money to full participation in the
polity with the term "economic citizenship," as distinguished from "political
citizenship." First-wave feminism sought political citizenship for women
through reforms such as female suffrage, and second-wave feminists similarly
fought to reform rape law and secure reproductive freedoms. But feminists in
both eras also pursued economic citizenship for women.61 Women's liberty to
pursue a profession, to be free from sex discrimination in compensation and
56. See Auchmuty, supra note 29; Adam Gearey, Women Lie Back Everywhere, supra note 5, at 91.
In addition, Belinda Fehlberg and Bruce Smyth mention the spousal-guarantee case Royal Bank of
Scotland v. Etridge (No.2) in passing. Belinda Fehlberg & Bruce Smyth, Binding Prenuptial Agreements
in Australia: The First Year, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, supra note 5, at 125, 130.
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (1981) (requiring mutual assent and
consideration for an agreement to be legally enforceable).
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981) ("To constitute consideration, a
performance or a return promise must be bargained for .... A performance or return promise is
bargained for if it is sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise and is given by the promisee in
exchange for that promise."). Some contracts scholars disagree on precisely what makes certain
agreements legally binding, such as the intent to be legally bound, or reliance. See, e.g., GRANT
GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 72 (12th prtg. 1982) (1974); Randy Barnett, A Consent Theory of
Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986).
59. Money of course also buys things that bring misery, such as illegal and addictive drugs, or an
expensive education culminating in a lifetime of soul-deadening employment.
60. Other nineteenth-century feminist reforms included raising the age of consent. Jane E. Larson,
"Even a Worm Will Turn at Last ": Rape Reform in Late Nineteenth-Century America, 9 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 1(1997).
61. In the eighteenth century, only male property holders were entitled to exercise the citizenship
right of voting, and married women could not hold property in their own names. LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN,
A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 146 (3d ed. 2005). Although married women's property acts entitled
married women to own property, among other things, American women did not obtain the right to vote
until 1920. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. Even now, property ownership continues to convey citizenship
rights. Homeowners enjoy more security physically and financially than do renters, and both of these
more than residents of single-room-occupancy hotels and homeless people. Michelle Adams, Knowing
Your Place: Theorizing Sexual Harassment at Home, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 17 (1998).
2006]
HeinOnline  -- 18 Yale J.L. & Feminism 555 2006
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
work conditions, and to take out loans are all related to economic citizenship.
62
Indeed, the feminization of poverty has been a major strand of feminist theory
and activism in the last generation. 63 The fact that financial wherewithal
facilitates protection of both intimate and public freedoms that constitute
citizenship reveals an overlap between political and economic citizenship.
64
The right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy is constrained by
restrictions on the use of federal funds to perform abortions.65 Moreover, given
women's continued responsibility for most care-giving labor, one can say that
the cases protecting women's power to control when and whether one has
children 66 helped facilitate women's entrance into the professions in significant
numbers starting in the 1970s.
67
Like most contracts and many feminist issues, spousal-guarantee cases deal
with money. For example, if a bank wants to collect a loan that it extended to
cover a husband's business debts, the bank can foreclose on the family home if
the wife signed as surety. The facts of the eight separate cases heard together in
Etridge (No. 2) illustrate some ways these obligations may arise:
* Mrs. Moore signed a blank mortgage application form at her
husband's urging after he misinformed her of the amount of the
loan, and without receiving any legal advice.
68
* Mrs. Harris signed documents upon her husband's request without
knowing what she signed "because she trusted him."
69
* Mrs. Coleman, a Hasidic Jew, had been raised "to expect and to
accept a position of subservience and obedience to her husband,"
so that she was "not merely disinclined to second-guess her
husband on matters of business, but appears to have regarded
herself as obliged not to do so."
70
* Mrs. Gill signed the document under pressure to act quickly,
despite a "heated altercation" with her husband after he asked her
to mortgage the family home, believing (along with the solicitor
62. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e) et seq. (2000); Equal
Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691 et seq. (2000); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872);
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979).
63. KATHRYN EDIN & LAURA LEIN, MAKING ENDS MEET: How SINGLE MOTHERS SURVIVE
WELFARE AND LOW-WAGE WORK (1997); LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED (1994).
64. Charles A. Reich, Property Law and the New Economic Order: A Betrayal of Middle
Americans and the Poor, 71 CH1.-KENT L. REV. 817, 817 (1996).
65. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396(a)(5), (a)(17), (a)(21), (b)(1), (b)(7) (1994). These patterns are not new.
Long ago, Jacobus ten Broek observed that there are two branches of family law, one for the rich, and
another for the poor. See JACOBUS TEN BROEK, FAMILY LAW AND THE POOR: ESSAYS (Joel Handler ed.,
1971).
66. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
67. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992) (citing ROSALIND POLLACK
PETCHESKY, ABORTION AND WOMAN'S CHOICE: THE STATE, SEXUALITY, AND REPRODUCTIVE
FREEDOM 109, 133 n.7 (rev. ed. 1990)).
68. Auchmuty, supra note 29, at 66.
69. Id. at 67 (citing Royal Bank of Scotland v. Etridge (No. 2), (2001) 4 All E.R. 524 (H.L.)).
70. Id.
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who advised her) that the loan was for £36,000 rather than the
actual amount of £100,000, and feeling that she "had no
alternative but to sign.
' 71
Because these facts raise serious questions about the genuineness of wives'
consent to the guarantees, English courts presume undue influence or
misrepresentation in cases where the surety and debtor are spouses or
cohabitants. However, banks are allowed to rebut this presumption by
establishing that the surety fully understood the nature and consequences of the
transaction-that she could lose her home.72 This rule causes banks to give
special notice to each wife/surety of the amount of her potential liability and of
the risks involved, and to advise her to get independent legal advice.
Contracts scholar Gillian Hadfield has introduced this line of cases to
American students of contracts.73 She recognizes that the notice required under
English law does little to remedy the tangle of sexual and emotional factors
producing marital agreements. Instead of notice, she proposes that the will
theory of contract be supplemented with a reliance-based theory of contract in
certain special cases, such as spousal-guarantees, surrogacy, and marital
separation agreements. In these cases, Hadfield contends, reliance should
supplement the will theory because the parties' consent might not represent a
true balancing of future costs and benefits as it would in commercial
transactions.
74
Rosemary Auchmuty's chapter in Feminist Perspectives, "The Rhetoric of
Equality and the Problem of Heterosexuality" takes Hadfield's discussion
further. Auchmuty proposes a ban on using the family home as collateral in
place of the undue influence doctrine's bar to enforcement of some guaranties.
Auchmuty explains in her chapter that the House of Lords extended the
"tenderness" English courts ordinarily show to married women in mortgage
cases as a matter of equity to "a wife (or anyone in a like position)" and "a
husband (or anyone in a like position)." 75 Auchmuty takes issue with this
extension.
Auchmuty begins with Cicily Hamilton's 1909 assertion that "marriage for
woman has always been not only a trade, but a trade that is practically
compulsory," which she then links to Adrienne Rich's contention seventy years
later that heterosexuality is compulsory. 76 What bothers Auchmuty is how the
71. Id. at 68.
72. Id. at 52-53.
73. Hadfield, supra note 36, at 1245. Hadfield also suggests that giving notice to wives but not
husbands might give rise to sex discrimination claims on the ground that women, but not men, are
required to incur the expense of independent legal advice. Id. at 1247.
74. Id. at 1282-84.
75. Auchmuty, supra note 29, at 51, 52.
76. Id. at 57-58 (citing CICILY HAMILTON, MARRIAGE AS A TRADE 28 (1909) and ADRIENNE RICH,
BLOOD, BREAD AND POETRY 23 (1980)). I made the same link between Hamilton and Rich in Martha
M. Ertman, Marriage as a Trade, Bridging the Private/Private Distinction, 36 HARV. Civ. R & Civ. LIB.
REV. 79, 95-96 (2001).
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new doctrine obscures the abuses inherent in heterosexuality by extending the
undue influence doctrine beyond marriage to same-sex couples.77 She contends
that she is not "advocating the introduction of a special rule for women but,
rather, an acknowledgment that the 'normal' expectations of gendered roles and
conduct within heterosexual relationships are neither inevitable nor natural but
socially constructed, structurally inequitable, and potentially oppressive to
women." 78 Specifically, Auchmuty critiques the extension of the undue
influence rule to gay people, because, she argues, they are less likely to need it
since they are "more egalitarian" and "free of gendered power differential.,
79
Therefore, Auchmuty contends, women suffer injury through heterosexuality
itself rather than through discrete injuries resulting from a particularly bad deal.
Her solution to this injury is not the band-aid of presumptions of undue
influence, but rather a tourniquet-cutting off the entire class of transactions.
Auchmuty proposes "a ban or limitation.., on the availability of the
family home as security for business debts" and presents this solution as
reflecting a "prioritization of what is important to most women-their home
and family--over the masculine concern of business profits."80 Auchmuty
herself, however, is pessimistic about courts adopting her proposal.8' While
Auchmuty's proposal is not inconsistent with American limitations on
particular kinds of collateral, such as wages, bank accounts, and consumer
goods,8 2 American law does not prevent debtors (directly or as sureties) from
mortgaging their homes to secure business debts.
American law formerly evidenced some concern for wives in spousal
guarantee cases, but that concern seems to have gone out of fashion with the
corset. "Voluntary" sureties, who guarantee loans without compensation, are
generally family members or other intimates. Recognizing this special context,
legal doctrine has long treated voluntary sureties as "favorites of the law,"
strictly construing the agreement in the surety's favor.83 In 1923, the Maine
77. Auchmuty, supra note 29, at 51 ("1 argue that the case law reveals that undue influence is the
consequence not of the dangers of intimacy per se, but of the dangers of heterosexual intimacy, or
simply of heterosexuality itself.").
78. Id. at 71.
79. Id. While data does suggest that gay men and lesbians are more egalitarian than heterosexual
couples in dividing housework, gendered differences do exist within same-sex relationships, in which
one man may take on more masculine work, for example, than the other. CHRISTOPHER CARRINGTON,
NO PLACE LIKE HOME: RELATIONSHIPS AND FAMILY LIFE AMONG LESBIANS AND GAY MEN (2002).
80. Auchmuty, supra note 29, at 71.
81. Id.
82. Article 9 of the U.C.C. does not govern transactions in which the debtor's wages are collateral,
federal law and state statutes closely regulate wage assignments. U.C.C. § 9-109(d)(3) cmt. 11 (2003).
Similarly, Article 9 does not cover transactions in which bank accounts are collateral in consumer
transactions. Id. § 9-109(d)(13). Moreover, section 9-204 prevents creditors from taking security
interests in consumer goods acquired by debtors more than ten days after the secured party gives value,
id. § 9-204, and a Federal Trade Commission regulation limits creditors' rights to obtain security
interests in "household goods." 16 C.F.R. § 444.1 et seq. (1999). A home is usually the most valuable
thing people own, making it considerably more attractive to creditors than wages, deposit accounts, and
consumer goods.
83. See, e.g., Royal Indem. Co. v. Northern Ohio Granite & Stone Co., 126 N.E. 405 (Ohio 1919).
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Supreme Judicial Court recognized that sureties who guarantee debts for family
members faced relaxed proof requirements in establishing duress:
Ordinarily the claim of duress ... must be sustained by threats which
create a reasonable fear of loss of life or of great bodily harm or of
imprisonment .... But there are exceptions to this rule, based on the
nearness and tenderness of family relations and the obviously
constraining force of close family ties.
8
In 1926, the Supreme Court of Kansas described the protection of voluntary
sureties as an "old rule." 85 By 1961, the Supreme Court of Minnesota enforced
Miss Dorothy Lewis's guarantee to pay the rent of a gift shop called The Purple
Door for Richard Pohl, despite the fact that she received no consideration,
specifically rejecting "judicial tenderness in dealing with the rights and
liabilities of sureties." 86 Today, wives who guarantee their husbands' business
debts can avoid losing their homes only if they show that the lending institution
knew of or participated in the husband's duress, misrepresentation, undue
influence, or fraud.87 Thus, in one case, a wife was not bound where she signed
an incomplete promissory note with her husband, and the husband then forged
her signature on the check that was jointly issued to both of them and used the
funds to buy stock in his name alone. 88 However, these facts are extreme. In
another, more typical, case, a court enforced a promissory note which a wife
signed only "because I trusted my husband and his judgment on business
affairs. I understood from my husband that if the document was not signed my
husband's business relationship with his attorney would be harmed." 89 In this
case, the court reasoned that a husband's mere persuasion did not overcome his
wife's free will. In short, American contract law worries less than English law
about the validity of married women's agreements to guarantee their husbands'
debts, a difference that also plays out in Australian and American doctrine
governing marital contracting.
Before transitioning from legal tender to tenderness, it is worth pausing to
note the counterintuitive conclusion of Belinda Fehlberg and Bruce Smyth's
chapter in Feminist Perspectives, which reports the results of their empirical
84. Flynt v. J. Waterman Co., 122 A. 862, 863 (Me. 1923). The court goes on to cite cases
involving fiancres, spouses, parents and children, aunts and nephews, and siblings. Id.
85. Headley v. Post, 243 P. 1042, 1044 (Kan. 1926) ("[T]he old rule that a surety is a favorite of the
law arose from judicial tenderness toward voluntary and accommodation sureties.").
86. Southdale Ctr. v. Lewis, 110 N.W.2d 857, 862 (Minn. 1961).
87. CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 28.10 (2006). Corbin lists the four elements of a prima facie case of
undue influence: (1) susceptibility of the party influenced (such as mental or physical weakness); (2) the
opportunity to exercise undue influence (such as through a confidential relationship, including spouses
or cohabitants); (3) a disposition to exercise undue influence (i.e., whether the influencer took the
intitative in the transaction and whether the person influenced had independent advice); and (4) the
unnatural nature of the transaction (as when a testator leaves significant property outside the family). For
two cases in which wives did not satisfy the burden of proof, see Sims v. First Nat'! Bank, 590 S.W.2d
270 (Ark. 1979); and Lesser v. Strubbe, 171 A.2d 114, 119 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1961), aff'd 1887
A.2d 705 (N.J. 1963).
88. Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Giacomi, 699 A.2d 101 (Conn. 1997).
89. Sun Forest Corp. v. Shvili, 152 F. Supp. 2d 367, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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study of changing doctrines governing Australian prenuptial agreements.
90
They begin with the familiar observation that men tend to benefit more than
women from prenuptial contracts. Since men are more likely to have economic
and social power, they are often able to induce their wives to contract around
the default rules of property and support.91 Thus, one would expect that
feminists-and women generally-would oppose Australia's adoption of the
American and Canadian rules enforcing prenuptial agreements. While Fehlberg
and Smyth found that people were likely to use prenuptial contracts when one
spouse had more assets than the other, they also found that prenuptial
agreements tend to appear when one or both parties are marrying for a second
time, have had previous family court involvement, or want to quarantine a
family asset or business. 92 Contrary to their expectations-and to American
conventional wisdom-Fehlberg and Smyth found that women were just as
likely as men to seek premarital agreements. They point out that this data is not
necessarily surprising, since older women entering second marriages may want
to protect property and finances. 93 Viewing their chapter in the context of the
rest of the book, one can say that the tenderness that law expresses to women in
facilitating the protection of their assets cuts various ways. Some women
benefit from contract (as when they quarantine individually held assets from
the claims of a second husband), and others do not (as when a richer partner
quarantines his own assets from her).
B. Tenderness
Legal protections for women based on their vulnerability as dependents
and as caregivers for dependents similarly cut both ways. On the one hand, it
makes sense to protect vulnerable parties. Commercial and corporate law do
that through a variety of rules protecting, for example, debtors and minority
shareholders in close corporations. 94 But the history of women and African-
Americans' second-class citizenship, and the way contract law reflected and
perpetuated that hierarchy, signal a downside to such an approach. I have
already discussed the way that tenderness (in particular protecting women's
access to legal tender) plays out in the spousal-guarantee context. The
90. Fehlberg & Smyth, supra note 56, at 125.
91. Id. at 127.
92. Id. at 133.
93. Id. at 134. The authors do not say that these women might want to protect property for children
from their first marriages. However, this would trigger the second sense of "tender": kindness toward
vulnerable parties.
94. For protections of debtors in secured transitions, see generally U.C.C. § 9-601 et seq. (2003).
For discussions of protections for minority shareholders being frozen out of closely held corporations,
see F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS AND LLC
MEMBERS § 9.26 (3d ed. 1998). Those protections undercut claims that other vulnerable or minority
groups should not enjoy protections through affirmative action and family law. See Aunpam Chander,
Minorities, Shareholder and Otherwise, 113 YALE L.J. 119 (2003); Ertman, supra note 76, at 115, 119-
120,129,131.
[Vol. 18:2
HeinOnline  -- 18 Yale J.L. & Feminism 560 2006
Legal Tenderness
following discussion addresses solicitude for women in three other doctrinal
areas in Feminist Perspectives: the postal rule in Adams v. Lindsell; prenuptial
agreements; and alternative dispute resolution.
1. Tenderness and the Postal Rule
Peter Goodrich's intriguing chapter in Feminist Perspectives on Contract
Law sets out a genealogy of the postal rule, linking it with the formation of
contracts to marry. Goodrich traces the history of the rule's evolution,
explaining that the rule was not widely accepted for nearly a century.95 The
most interesting point for our purposes is his assertion that "every contract is
like a marriage.' 96 He argues that the ecclesiastical rules governing marriage
migrated into assumpsit cases through breach of promise to marry cases, and
that this migration included the postal rule. The postal rule gives preference to
the offeree's interests by making an acceptance legally valid at the moment it
leaves the offeree's hands, protecting her from an offeror's fickleness by
depriving him of the right to revoke after dispatch but before receipt. This
deference, one might say tenderness, to the offeree is directly related to the
breach of promise to marry cases that proliferated in the nineteenth century.
Since men proposed marriage and women accepted, the postal rule expressed
tenderness toward the woman's honor. As Goodrich explains, "[r]ecognition of
the social standing and the cultural expectations of the feminine offeree, and
attention to her position and predicament, meant that equity clearly favoured
protecting her reliance interest in the offer and preventing the offeror from
speculating." 97 While Goodrich is careful not to overstate his case for the link
between marriage and commercial contracts, 98 he unequivocally asserts that the
"doctrinal root of that desire to protect the offeree can be traced directly to
cases of breach of promise to marry." 99 Beyond the particulars of the postal
rule, this observation reminds students of contracts that tenderness for
systemically vulnerable parties (debtors and tenants as well as women on
occasion) is an integral part of contract doctrine. It is, moreover, not always a
bad thing.
2. Tenderness and Premarital Agreements
Like the spousal-guarantee cases, the premarital agreement doctrine
discussed above in the Fehlberg and Smyth's study seeks special protections
for women in contracts associated with marriage. As Australian law changed to
allow enforcement of premarital contracts as well as contracts entered during
95. Goodrich, supra note 10, at 81-82.
96. Id. at 81-86.
97. Id. at 85.
98. Id. at 81.
99. Id. at 83.
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marriage, it built in protections for women. Yet some of these protections
inhibited the effectiveness of the new statute.' 00 Most notably, insurers refused
to provide malpractice insurance to cover the attorney certification that the new
law made a prerequisite to legal enforceability. The statute required attorneys to
certify whether the agreement was to the signer's advantage, was fair, and was
prudent. Legal malpractice insurers refused to extend coverage for the required
certifications, contending that an attorney's views on these matters amounted to
financial rather than legal advice. 10 1 Moreover, even if an attorney did state in
the certificate of independent legal advice that the client was signing "under a
continuing economic disadvantage-for example emotional pressure," the
statement might not prevent enforcement of the agreement since suretyship
case law provides that independent legal counsel may be enough to bind the
client despite such a statement.' 02 But the rarity of marital contracting-
Fehlberg and Smyth found that only 13 couples out of 650 surveyed entered
into such agreements °3-makes the discussion as much or more about the
expressive function of the law as about a pressing legal issue. Perhaps spousal-
guarantees get more attention in the book because they have generated
considerable case law, which may occur because the banks involved can absorb
the transaction costs of litigation better than individuals. 1
04
3. Tenderness and Alternative Dispute Resolution
But there can be downsides to special treatment, and indeed to theoretical
approaches that make general claims about contract law and gender. Linda
Mulcahy's chapter, "Bargaining in the Shadow of the Flaws? The Feminisation
of Dispute Resolution," both flags and falls into this trap. Mulcahy begins with
the premise that mediation benefits women in three ways: (1) by rejecting
"masculine values of the courtroom"; (2) by "privileging values associated with
feminism, which reflect an ethic of care and the importance of context and
relationship"; and (3) by "facilitating political goals by raising awareness of
masculine paradigms."' 5 But her contention that classical contract doctrine,
more than other legal doctrines, articulates "hostile egoism and possessive
100. The Australian statute in place at the time of the study dictated that premarital and postmarital
agreements bind if they are in writing, signed by both parties, each party has received independent legal
advice, and the agreement has not been terminated by the parties. Fehlberg & Smyth, supra note 56, at
129. The requirement of independent legal advice is satisfied if an attorney appends a statement that she
provided independent legal advice as to the effect of the agreement on her client's rights, whether it was
to the advantage, financially or otherwise, of the client, whether it was prudent for that party to make the
agreement, and whether the agreement's provisions were fair and reasonable. Id. The authors note that
these rules soon faced legislative amendment to relax the attorney certification provisions. Id. at 125 n.1.
101. Id. at 135.
102. Id. at 136-37.
103. Id. at 128.
104. Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the Justice
System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953 (2000).
105. Mulcahy, supra note 14, at 145.
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individualism" by taking people away from the "preexisting web of
community ' 06 overlooks the facts that individualism and possession of
property, as discussed above, can be a good thing for many women, and also
that communities can enforce gender norms at the expense of individual
interests. Moreover, describing Richard Posner's approach as "high octane
masculine values" and condemning privatization' 0 7 overlooks the fact that
some feminists have relied on his work and contractual norms of "performance,
control, security of transaction and standardization"' 108 to justify feminist
reforms and believe that privatization can both help and hurt women. 10 9 These
insights bring us to the third sense of "tender," relative to contract law and
women's independence.
C. Tend Her
The phrase "tend her," a play on the "tenderness" theme of this Review, is
admittedly an oblique way to raise issues of individuality within the "tender"
rubric. But it does question the advisability of legal doctrine protecting women,
as opposed to leaving them to tend to themselves. I raise it here to pull out the
strand associated with tending oneself, and in doing so to engage any systemic
conflicts between classical views of the will-based theory of contract on the one
hand and feminist impulses to occasionally protect women from bad deals on
the other. As discussed above, some chapters in Feminist Perspectives propose
that contract law adjust to protect women from bad choices in some contexts,
such as with the spousal-guarantee cases.
David Campbell's afterword makes it clear that he thinks this is a bad idea.
He directly engages the question of contracts protecting the individual's
interests by contesting Auchmuty's proposed ban on wives guaranteeing their
husbands' business debts with the family home. Campbell suggests that
Auchmuty seeks a special rule to protect women and argues that her rule harms
the very people she seeks to protect by infantilizing them." 0 He contends that
feminist theory works better in alternative dispute resolution than contract
formation, lauding Linda Mulcahy's chapter championing alternative dispute
resolution as "the most accomplished chapter" in the book.",
106. Id. at 147.
107. Id. at 147, 153.
108. Id. at 147.
109. See, e.g., HIRSI-IMAN & LARSON, supra note 3, at 284-86; Martha M. Ertman,
Commercializing Marriage, 77 TEX. L. REV. 17, 97-110 (1998); Silbaugh, supra note 3.
110. David Campbell, Afterword: Feminism, Liberalism and Utopianism in the Analysis of
Contracting, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, supra note 5, at 165.
111. Id. at 162. He does not mention that a line of American feminist scholarship has questioned
whether the soft and fuzzy norms of ADR might disserve some women in divorce proceedings, nor that
ADR can be more rigid than litigation in its norms and substantive rules. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein,
Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144
U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1766-71 (1996); Penelope Eileen Bryan, The Coercion of Women in Divorce
Settlement Negotiations, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 931 (1997).
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Many feminists would share his view that special rules protecting married
women in contracting situations with their husbands smack of the kind of
"repugnant paternalism" 112 that created the need for feminism in the first place.
Rejecting Hadfield's proposed importation of Elizabeth Anderson's expressive
values in contract to supplement the will theory of enforcement, Campbell
asserts that contract law based on any value other than party autonomy is not
contract law:
The chapters in this volume show that feminism certainly can make a
considerable contribution to the critique of the classical law of
contract, and they link to an economic and philosophical literature in
which feminism is putting forward a powerful general critique of
bourgeois individualism. However, if they do not place a pre-eminent
value on autonomy, feminists cannot really respect the law of contract,
for a law of contract that does not turn on autonomy and choice
becomes something like a law of planned, paternalistic exchanges, that
is, not contract at all."l3
If Campbell is right, then the entire book is a contradiction in terms, except to
the extent that "feminist" views of contract are limited to liberal critiques of
contract rules that exclude women from the rights that men enjoy. But
feminism is much broader than that, incorporating cultural feminist focus on
relationships (and legal protections of the vulnerabilities that arise from those
relationships), as well as radical feminist efforts to upend cultural categories of
sex and gender.
Indeed, I would argue that Hadfield's expressive theory of contract finds
considerable ground in existing contract doctrine. Hadfield chooses three
puzzles of contract law-surrogacy, spousal-guarantees, and marital separation
contracts-and proposes that legal doctrine could "transcend the dilemma of
choice":
The structure of a contract law based on an appreciation of expressive
choice would begin with an assessment of whether a given category of
contract normally is entered into in a risk-allocation frame. Absent the
risk-allocation frame, there is a need to assess the reasons there might
be for enforcement. 
114
She suggests that where parties do not enter contracts conscious of risk-
allocation, courts look to two things: (1) reliance interests at stake; and (2)
instrumental justifications for enforcement in light of the value of the contract
and the risk non-enforcement poses for contract law generally. 115 The spousal-
guarantee cases are particularly good examples of agreements entered into with
a richer relational aspect than most, and a thinner risk-allocation aspect than
most. Here, Hadfield persuasively argues that relational principles come to the
112. Campbell, supra note 110, at 172.
113. Id.
114. Hadfield, supra note 36, at 1282.
115. Id.
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fore, including cooperation over time, reliance through coordination,
communication, and commitment. In her words, "they are woven from and into
a fabric of societal and relationship-specific norms."
' 1 6
As we evaluate the extent to which contract doctrine that accounts for
hierarchy at the expense of autonomy is still contract doctrine, it is important to
keep in mind that contract has never been one thing in relation to have-nots.
Freedmen were held to coercive labor contracts that replicated slavery in many
respects, 17 and labor conditions entered into under purported freedom of
contract were often brutal for both men and women.' 18 Reva Siegel has coined
the term "preservation through transformation" to describe the process by
which purported improvements to the legal status of blacks and women have
also perpetuated hierarchies." 
9
Sally Wheeler's chapter in Feminist Perspectives on Contract Law
illustrates one strand of nineteenth century views of married women and
contract. She describes how doctrines relating to coverture (including the
doctrine of necessaries and the state-supplied marriage contract itself)
constrained Victorian women's contractual powers to buy clothing.' Married
women's property acts changed much of that baseline by granting married
women rights to contract as well as to hold and dispose of property, but courts
interpreted them narrowly to keep most property, and thus independence, away
from women. 121 Interestingly, these rights of economic citizenship predated
women's political citizenship. Married women exercised their (albeit limited)
rights under the married women's property acts for half a century before they
got the vote, and for nearly a century before they served on juries with any
regularity.
122
116. Id. at 1283-84.
117. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877 (2002).
For an argument linking nineteenth- and early twentieth-century peonage contracts to the Thirteenth
Amendment and late twentieth-century welfare reform, see Julie A. Nice, Welfare Servitude, 1 GEO. J.
ON FIGHTING POVERTY 340 (1994).
118. STANLEY, supra note 42, at 76-84. The high-water mark for classical liberalism in labor law is
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Given the importance for women of defining the limits and
beneficial applications of contract, it is hardly surprising that the demise of liberalism is conventionally
linked to judicial acceptance of fair-labor laws protecting women. See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
300 U.S. 379 (1937).
119. Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-
Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1111 (1997).
120. Sally Wheeler, Going Shopping, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, supra note 5, at 21. The doctrine
of necessaries held a husband liable for debts incurred by his wife for small items, a rule which turned
on married women's incapacity to contract under coverture. A number of courts have held the doctrine
of necessaries unconstitutional as applied to women, but it continues to apply when minors enter
contractual relationships or where gender neutral. See, e.g., A. Mechele Dickerson, Family Values and
the Bankruptcy Code: A Proposal to Eliminate Bankruptcy Benefits Awarded on the Basis of Marital
Status, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 69, 75 n.30 (1998).
121. Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives' Rights to
Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 GEO. L. J. 2127 (1994).
122. LINDA K. KERBER, NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT To BE LADIES 136-220 (1998). Indeed,
military service, one of the hallmarks of citizenship, is still not open to women on the same basis as
men. For a review of the history of American women and military service, see id. at 221-302.
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The fact that women's rights to contract laid the foundation for women's
political rights makes Charles Fried's condemnation of the infantilizing effect
of departures from assumptions of autonomy particularly persuasive. He
explains:
If we decline to take seriously the assumption of an obligation because
we do not take seriously the promisor's prior conception of the good
that led him to assume it, to that extent we do not take him seriously as
a person. We infantilise him [as we do quite properly when we release
the very young from the consequences of their choices]. 
123
Adult autonomy is all the more important when we consider the unique role of
contract in skirting majoritarian rules. For example, testators can "contract"
around default rules provided by intestacy law to bequeath their property to an
intimate, such as a same-sex partner, whom the state refuses to recognize
through intestacy laws. Similarly, adoptive parents can "contract" with birth
parents for visitation to facilitate connection between adoptive children and the
birth parents despite the state's failure or refusal to recognize that
relationship. 124
There is a lot to be said for contract's ability to skirt hostile background
rules. In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the 1978 revolution changed the law to
value women half as much as men (setting them back 1400 years). Nobel
laureate Shirin Ebadi managed to contract around the new rules that gave her
husband the power to divorce her at will, take custody of their children, and
acquire three wives, which would have allowed her husband to stay a person
while she became chattel. Outraged by these rules (despite the fact that her
husband had no intention of exercising the powers they gave him), she took
him to a notary's office, where he waived his newly acquired rights under the
Islamic Republic's law. 
125
Contract reasoning and doctrine also remedy more mundane problems. At
the doctrinal level, primary homemakers' contributions to family wealth could
be recognized in contractual terms. 126 On a theoretical level, I have contended
that the law can and should recognize a range of intimate relationships just as it
123. Campbell, supra note 110, at 166 (quoting FRIED, supra note 27, at 20-21).
124. Even if some contracts, such as contracts to buy sperm from anonymous donors, have the
downside of depriving children of contact with one genetic parent, perhaps the remedy for this kind of
"bad" contract is more contracting. The demand for familial connection among sperm bank babies has
created a market for that connection, satisfied through membership in an online registry of children who
are genetically related but would not otherwise know each other. Membership in the registry is $40 a
year. Jennifer Egan, Wanted: A Few Good Sperm, N. Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 19 2006, at 44, 81. See also
Donor Sibling Registry, http://www.donorsiblingregistry.com (last visited Nov. 20, 2006).
125. Laura Secor, Book Review, A Dissenting Voice, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2006, § 7, at 14
(reviewing SHIRIN EBADI WITH AZADEH MOAVENI, IRAN AWAKENING: A MEMOIR OF REVOLUTION AND
HOPE (2006)).
126. Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on Playing with Dolls,
Partnership Buyouts and Dissociation Under No-Fault, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 67 (1993). An alternative
model is based on Article 9 of the U.C.C. and contends that primary wage earners are indebted to their
primary homemaking spouses, giving homemakers an entitlement to part of the wage-eamers' post-
divorce income as repayment of the debt. Ertman, supra note 109.
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recognizes a range of business forms, analogizing marriage to a close
corporation, cohabitation to a general partnership, and polyamory to a limited
liability company.1 27 Jane Larson and Linda Hirshman have suggested that
game theory can level the playing field of men and women in sexual matters,
128
Adrienne Davis has documented the ways that some white men's wills
bequeathing property to their black paramours in the nineteenth century
recognized relationships that intestacy law would not, 129 and Elizabeth Emens
has recently suggested that contractual analysis of marital name changes might
dislodge the practice of women taking men's names upon marriage. 130
The fruitfulness of applying feminist views to contract, and contractual
views to feminist questions, is illustrated by an American case, Borelli v.
Brusseau.13 1 While Borelli does not appear in Feminist Perspectives (which is
hardly surprising since nearly all the cases discussed are English), it does
appear in some casebooks. Discussing Borelli in contracts class makes sense
because the case shows both the benefits and limits of contractual analysis, and
also how courts selectively recognize contract doctrine in situations of
contested marketization, such as contracts within families and for organ
sales. 132 Most startling is how the case demonstrates how the old rules
regarding gender still bleed through to contemporary cases.
In Borelli, the California Court of Appeals refused to enforce a husband's
promise to convey property to his wife in exchange for her promise to care for
him at home after he suffered a stroke. (The alternative was a nursing home.)
Three contracts were at issue: (1) a premarital agreement in which Hildegard
Borelli waived her rights to Michael Borelli's property; (2) his oral promise to
alter that prenuptial agreement to substitute her care for nursing home care; and
(3) the state-imposed marital contract. The feminist reader with a chip on her
shoulder will note that all three contracts were construed against Hildegard, and
that she would have been better off in a regime that either refused to enforce
the prenuptial agreement or was willing to enforce the postnuptial agreement.
Mrs. Borelli signed the premarital agreement waiving her rights to
substantial property the day before their wedding.' 33 While in a rehabilitation
center after Mr. Borelli suffered a stroke, they orally agreed that Mrs. Borelli
would provide nursing-home type care in their home in exchange for his
promise to leave her property beyond what she would receive under the
127. Ertman, supra note 76.
128. See, e.g., HIRSHMAN & LARSON, supra note 3, at 283-86.
129. Davis, supra note 3.
130. Elizabeth F. Emens, Changing Name Changing: Framing Rules and the Future of Marital
Names, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007).
131. 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16 (1993). At least one leading contracts casebook includes Borelli. See
CHARLES L. KNAPP, NATHAN M. CRYSTAL & HARRY G. PIERCE, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 705 (4th ed. 2001).
132. For a discussion of marketization of human organs, see MICHELE GOODWIN, BLACK
MARKETS: THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND FOR BODY PARTS (2006).
133. Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 17.
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prenuptial agreement. 134 When he died his estate refused to honor the oral
agreement. The California Court of Appeal held that the oral agreement lacked
consideration since she had a non-delegable obligation to care for her husband
under the state-defined marriage contract. It relied on World War II-era case
law to reach this result:
[A] wife is obligated by the marriage contract to provide nursing-type
care to an ill husband. Therefore, contracts whereby the wife is to
receive compensation for providing such services are void as against
public policy and there is no consideration for the husband's
promise. 
35
At the time these cases were decided, spouses could not contract away
obligations of support or property settlement.' 36 However, by the time the
Borellis entered their marriage the law had changed, so that Michael Borelli
could have his cake and eat it, too, by altering the part of the state-provided
marriage contract that mandated property-sharing with his wife, and keeping
the part that compelled her to personally nurse him through illness.
Surprisingly, Mr. Borelli's alteration of his support obligations the day
before the wedding did not figure into the majority opinion (and was only
tangentially mentioned in the dissent). The court explained:
[T]he duty of support can no more be "delegated" to a third party than
the statutory duties of fidelity and mutual respect. Marital duties are
owed by the spouses personally. This is implicit in the definition of
marriage as "a personal relation arising out of a civil contract between
a man and a woman."
137
In essence, the court allowed Mr. Borelli to alter the "civil contract" regarding
property distribution in marriage, but refused to allow Mrs. Borelli to alter her
care-taking responsibilities:
We therefore adhere to the longstanding rule that a spouse is not
entitled to compensation for support, apart from rights to community
property and the like that arise from the marital relation itself.
Personal performance of a personal duty created by the contract of
marriage does not constitute new consideration.1
38
The clause "apart from rights to community property and the like" does a lot of
work. Mrs. Borelli did not get her share of community property because of the
prenuptial contract, but she was still stuck personally providing round-the-clock
care.
Maybe this outcome is okay. Perhaps money and love are analytically
separate. 139 Maybe Mr. Borelli can contract away his obligations to share
134. Id. at 17-18.
135. Id. at 18-19 (citing In re Estate of Sonnicksen, 73 P.2d 643, 645 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1937);
Brooks v. Brooks, 119 P.2d 970, 971-73 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1941)).
136. Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970).
137. Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 4100 (1992)).
138. Id. at 20 (emphasis added).
139. ZELIZER, supra note 3, at 28-29.
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property with her but retain her obligation to care for him during an illness. The
majority opinion implies as much in defending itself against the dissent's
criticism of the old case law's gendered foundations, stating that "[i]f the rule
denying compensation for support originated from considerations peculiar to
women, this has no bearing on the rule's gender-neutral application today."'
140
But marriage remains highly gendered, as reflected by the fact that wives still
do seventy percent of homemaking labor (a specialization that must affect how
husbands and wives care for one another during illness) and husbands still have
higher incomes on average and control more property than women.14 1 Indeed,
in the United States, men are more likely to seek to protect their separate
property through premarital agreements, and women are more likely to contest
them. 
142
Judge Poche's dissent argues for the benefits of contract over status by
accusing the majority of resuscitating coverture and by defending contractual
understandings of marriage:
Insofar as marital duties and property rights are not governed by
positive law, they may be the result of informal accommodation or
formal agreement .... No longer can the marital relationship be
regarded as "uniform and unchangeable."
143
Moreover, he continues, California has long granted husbands and wives "the
utmost freedom of contract" in both statute and case law.
144
But a close read of California's statutory creation of contractual freedom
between husbands and wives may support the majority's view that Mr. Borelli
may sell Mrs. Borelli down the river financially and still compel her to provide
round-the-clock care. The statute provided that "either husband or wife may
enter into any transaction with the other, or with any other person, respecting
property, which either might if unmarried." 145 Thus it seems that, at least in this
context, men are more likely to benefit from the increased contractualization of
marital rights and obligations. Indeed, for over three decades courts have
enforced premarital agreements, and these agreements are likely to benefit the
richer spouse, who is more likely to be the husband than the wife. Under
Borelli, caregiver spouses, who are more likely to be wives than husbands,
cannot limit the obligations they are most likely to bear, i.e. care-giving. In
short, what is good for the gander can stink for the goose.
140. Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20.
141. Yun-Suk Lee & Linda J. Waite, Husbands' and Wives' Time Spent on Housework: A
Comparison of Measures, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAMILY 328 (2005).
142. Barbara Ann Atwood, Ten Years Later: Lingering Concerns About the Uniform Premarital
Agreement Act, 19 J. LEGIS. 127 (1993). But see supra note 93 and accompanying text.
143. Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 22 (Poche, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 23 (quoting Perkins v. Sunset Tel. & Tel. Co., 103 P. 190 (Cal. 1909); CAL. CIV. CODE
§5103(a) (Deering 1992) (repealed 1994) (providing that "either husband or wife may enter into any
transaction with the other, or with any other person, respecting property, which either might if
unmarried")). The rule is stated now in CAL. FAM. CODE §721 (2003).
145. CAL. CIv. CODE §5103(a) (Deering 1992) (repealed 1994) (emphasis added).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Feminism and contract have more in common than many people think, in
particular because both address problems of individual agency and
accountability that are important elements of full citizenship. In discussing
Feminist Perspectives, this Review has extracted themes that may enrich
contracts classes and feminist theory discussions. On the doctrinal level, Borelli
v. Brusseau tells us that perhaps courts should not enforce property agreements
between spouses since they would have a hard time enforcing the non-
delegable duties of sympathy, comfort, love, companionship, and affection in
the state-provided marriage contract. 146 Or perhaps the dissent in Borelli is
right, and Mrs. Borelli should at least be able to try to prove the oral
modification of the prenuptial contract with Mr. Borelli. Like other cases, this
contract dispute between spouses also tells us about the promise and danger of
contract analysis, much of which is represented in Feminist Perspectives on
Contract Law, and much of which might find its way into a contracts class:
In re Baby M and Johnson v. Calvert,147 two surrogacy cases, may
provide a springboard to discuss a number of issues. Carol Sanger
spends two full class sessions using Baby M to preview the
course's basic themes, including how to read a case, choice of law,
damages, and legal theory. 148 Within this discussion, a tension
generally emerges between enforceability and contractual
capacity. The impasse between capacity to contract and the
dehumananizing effects of surrogacy reflects an irresolvable
conflict between two equally good and important things: (1)
freedom of contract; and (2) protection of dignity, solidarity, and
equality. 149 Another route into the question of enforceability may
explore who benefits from contractualization, and in particular
how contract doctrine and theory are improved or harmed by using
contract to regulate contested contexts such as reproduction.
* It is difficult to ignore the fact that people resisting contract
enforcement in many canonical undue influence cases are female.
In Vokes v. Arthur Murray Dance Studios,l15 the plaintiff was a
lonely widow tricked into buying $31,000 of dance lessons by
146. Katharine B. Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts and the Family Economy, 93 NW. L. REV. 65
(1998).
147. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988); Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993), cert
den'd, 510 U.S. 874 (1993).
148. Sanger, supra note 17.
149. For a fuller discussion of the antinomous qualities of freedom of contract versus equality,
dignity, and solidarity in commodification discussions, see Ertman & Williams, supra note 3.
150. 212 So. 2d 906 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
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high praise for her nonexistent dancing abilities from Arthur
Murray Dance Studios. Does it matter that this doctrine tends to
protect women? In particular, does it undercut autonomy-based
definitions of contract? Is it significant that American law protects
these parties without explicitly referring to their gender, while
English law explicitly extends "special tenderness" to wives in
guarantee cases?
" In Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 15 1 the canonical
unconscionability case, Mrs. Williams is female, poor, and
African-American. This combination of characteristics often leads
to rich classroom discussions about whether the doctrines of undue
influence and unconscionability are employed to remedy both the
historic and contemporary fragility of women, people of color and
poor people, and should be.
* If we recognize the marital roots of Adams v. Lindsell,152 the case
establishing that acceptance occurs at the time of dispatch by the
offeree, then at least in this context, the marriage contract rules
provide the basis for commercial contract doctrine. Under this
analysis, puzzles regarding marital contracts (similarly to or
differently from commercial contracts) might look quite different.
If marriage is the original and not the special case, the question
may be whether marital rules should apply to commercial
contracts, rather than vice versa. Moreover, the tremendous
changes of the marriage contract over time, which are akin to the
changes in employment contracts over the last century, illustrate
the legal realist idea that law keeps changing as society keeps
changing.
This Review has focused on English spousal-guarantee cases to provide a
particularly strong foundation for discussing ways that the contract law can
resolve monetary disputes, protect vulnerable parties whose consent might be
less than freely given, and recognize that parties' individuality is central to their
claims as adult members of the polity. Future work may explore whether these
three concerns relating to legal tenderness apply in other doctrinal areas, and in
doing so demonstrate the things feminism and contract law have to offer one
another.
151. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
152. (1818) 106 Eng. Rep. 250 (K.B.).
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